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THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85, PARAGRAPH 1, OF THE TREATY OF ROME
TO INTRASTATE EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSIDP AGREEMENT: S. A.
Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkins-Janssen, 2 CCH Com. ~
Rep. '8053 (1967)

Brasserie de Haecht, a Belgian brewery, and Consorts Wilkins-Janssen,
owners of a tavern located in Belgium, entered into three contracts. The tavern
owners, in return for loans, agreed to obtain all their beverages from Brasserie
de Haecht. When the tavern owners failed to comply with the exclusive purchasing
obligation contained in the contract, the brewery brought an action before the Commercial Court of Liege for cancellation of the loan contracts.
As a defense to the action, the tavern owners alleged that the contracts were
in violation of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome (298 U.N. T. s. 11) which created
the Common Market.1- The contracts, it was urged, were "likely to affect trade
between the Member States" of the Common Market; therefore, enforcement of the
contracts by the National Court would be incompatible with the community. Since
the contracts themselves did not deal with commerce between Member states and
their likely inter-Member-State effect was minimal, the defendants admitted that
the agreement would not sufficiently affect trade between Member States if considered
in isolation. However, they urged the Court to consider the large number of similar
contracts between other Belgian breweries and a great many Belgian distributors.
The defense argued .that these contracts, taken as a whole, indirectly affected commerce between Member States by preventing the Belgian distributors from selling
beer from other Member states. Although both parties were Belgian, and:fuch
"brewery contracts" were expressly permitted by the Belgian legislators, the
1.

2.

Treaty Article 85 provides in part:
"(1) The following practices shall be prohibited as inco-:npatible with the Commo'1
Market: all agreements between undertakings, all decisions by associations of
undertakings and all concerted practices which are liable to affect trade between Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict, or distort
competition within the Common Market or which have this effect . . . .
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
automatically be null and void.
(3) The provisions of Paragraph 1 may however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of: any agreement Of type of agreement betwee:1 undertakings
. . . which helps to improve the production or distribution of goods or to
promote technical or economic progress, while allo-.ving consumers a fair
share of the resulting profit and which· does not: . . . . "
Royal Decree No. 62 of Janu:~ry 13, 1935, which provides that any professional
association of manufacturers or distributors vested with legal personality may
seek the extentio_n of obligations, voluntarily assumed by it, concerning production, distribution sale, export or impo:-t, to all other manufacturers or
distributors belonging to the S3me branch of industry or commerce. Interesting,
though beyond the scope of this note, is the fact that the National Court could
have ruled the contracts invalid under national law, Royal Dec1ee 19 6L., which
limits the length of these contracts to four years. Thus, the National Court
could have avoided the Common Market Issue.
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National Court requested a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities under the procedure set forth in Article 177. 3 It submitted to the Court of
Justice this question: whether in applying Article 85, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty, the
Court should consider the agreement in isolation or in terms of the whole economic and
legal context. 4 It was held that exclusive dealing contracts ofthis type are not necessarily
incompatible with the Common Market. However, such contracts may fulfill the conditions
for incompatibility contained in Article 85, Paragraph 1, where "either in isolation or
together with others in the economic and legal context in which they were concluded and
on the basis of all the objective elements of law or facts, they are likely to impair trade
between Member states and their objects or effect is to prevent, restrict, or distort
competition. "5
The plaintiff contended before the Court of Justice that the issue was whether
the three conditions set forth in Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome were met by the
contracts.
The plaintiff considered the three conditions to be: (1) an agreement between enterprises; (2) that restricts trade between Member States; and (3)
restricts free competition. They admitted that the contract in issue was one between
enterprises but they denied that the effect of the contract was either to restrict
trade between Member states or to distort competition. As to trade between States,
they submitted "market impenetrability" as the key factual issue. The breweries
argued that parallel imports were possible, because there were many independent
taverns and no partitioning of the Belgian market; hence, ease of entry into the
Belgian market by competitors from other Member States.
With reference to the issue of distortion of competition, the plaintiff contended that the agreement should be considered solely in terms of other agreements
within the same network. Therefore, the Brasserie network of contracts, they
argued, was too small to have any "perceptible affect. "6
The tavern owners differed" They urged it to be essential to consider similar
agreements concluded by third parties relating to similar products. They pointed out
that the great number of agreements throughout Belgium created "a significant obstacle to the import of foreign beers into Belgium." 7 They cited the intent of the
3.

4.

Treaty Article 177 provides:
"The CourtofJustice shall be competent to give prelimin.'iry rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; . . . Where any such question is raised
before any court of law of one of the Member States, the said court may, if
it considers that a dec~ision on the qu2stion is essential to enable it to render
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. " (There are
serious doubts as to -...vhether Article 177 rulings are binding on the national courts
at all. §.ee Buxbam, In:::omplete federalism: Jurisdiction Over Antitrust Matters
in European Econ~mic Community, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 56, 80-89 (1964)).
Submission to the Cou-~t of Justice by the National Court noted in 5 C. M. L. Rev.

324.
5.
6.
7.

2 CCH Com. Mkt. Rep.
8053 at 7805.
at 7803.
Perhaps it is unfortunate that the Cou:t did not submit directly the question
whether the foreclosure of beverages from other countries was enough to find
likelines.o of effect. Se~ note on submission by the NationalCourt, ~upra note 4.
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Belgian legislators in creating legislation fostering "brewery contracts" in order
to protect Belgian breweries from the competition of German and Dutch breweries.
Therefore, they concluded that the Court must consider all the exclusive contracts
in the relevant market to determine whether any one of them affected commerce in
such a way as to be incompatible with the Common Market.
Both parties· relied on the decisi.on in Establissement Consten and Grundig
v. EEC Commission. 8 In that case Establissement Consteii, a French firm, and
Grundig, a German electronics firm, entered into an exclusive distributorship
contract. The French firm agreed not to sell products competing with Grundig;
in return, they were appointed Grundig's exclusive sales representative in France.
The Commission of the EuroJEan Economic Community held that the agreement
was likely to affect trade so as to meet the requirements of 85(1); therefore, it was
void under 85(2). The Court of Justice affirmed in a decision which has become
extremely important in the area of "affects" under Article 85(1).
Plaintiff contended that the decision stressed the "purpose" of the agreement.
Therefore, an analysis of an agreement should be limited mainly to its content. The
Advocate General's opinion 9 found this contention clearly erroneous. He suggested
that when the purpose of the agreement does not suffice, the effect must be controlling.
Further, he distinguished the present case from Consten-Grundig because
the agreement was between firms of different Member States. The Court in Grundig
was not concerned with wholly intra-Member-State agreements. Therefore, he
felt the fact situation was too dissimilar to be conclusive in the present case.
Another case relied on by both parties was Societe Techniques Mini~re v.
Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH. 10, involving a fact situation similar to Grundig, wherein
a French retailer had an exclusive contract with a German manufacturer. Plaintiff
in the present case relied on a literal reading of the opinion, contending that the
opinion held that only agreements within the same network as the agreement in
question should be considered. They read the opinion to hold that the question is
whether the competition would be improved without the agreement in question. However,
the o}i.nion contains language which refutes both interpretations. "To fulfill this condition, [likeliness of affecting trade between Memter States] an agreement must, on
the basis of all the objective elements of law or of fact taken together, indicate that
there is a sufficient degree of probability that it may have some influence, direct or
indirect, actual or potential, on the flow of trade between Member States." 11 (emphasis
added) Clearly, this language indicated that Maschinenbau Ulm does not stand for
8.

2CCH Com Mkt. Rep. 8046 (1966); noted 8.e Harv. Rev. 1594 (1967); 4 C.M.L.
Rev . 214 (19 6 6- 6 7) .

9.

Treaty Article 166 provides:
"The Court of Justice shall be assisted by two advo::::~tes-general.
It shall be the duty of the advocate-general to make reasoned submissions
(conclusions) in open Court to the Court of Justice on matters referred to it.
He shall do so with complete impartiality and independence with a view to
achieve the task assigned to it in Article 164." (i.e.
ensure the observan::::e of law in the interpretatio:l and application of this Treaty.")
10. 2 CCH. Com. Mkt. Rep. 8047 (1966).
11. !._<i_. at 7696.
1
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the proposition that an agreement should be evaluated in isolation or that the quality
of the "influence" is conclusive. However, it only abstractly deals with the problem
in Brasserie, and, like Grundig, does not go directly to the problem of an agreement affecting intra-Member-state trade. Therefore, this language, though enlightening, does not answer the question asked by the National Court. Consequently,
neither of these prominent cases were much help to the Court in Brasserie, although
they were considered for their importance in blazing a trail towards an "atfect"
doctrine in the Common Market.
·
There has been a great deal of "juridical and legislative" controversy over the
language of Article 85(1) requiring an agreement to be "likely to affect trade between
the Member states. "12 It is felt that Grundig settled the dispute. There, the Court of
Justice rejected the argument that it must be demonstrated that trade 'would have
developed more favorably, i.e., more intensely, without the agreement objected to. "13
Consequently, they rejected a "rule of reason" approach which involves consideration
of the "harmful" or "beneficial" effects. 14 Instead, the Court held that the ''affect"
language was jurisdictional and little more. Just as the language of the Sherman Act
in the United states, ("trade or commerce among the several states") is intended
to define the jurisdiction of the Federal Government under our antitrust laws, so the
words "liable to affect trade between the Member states" in the competition laws of
the European Economic Community have now been construed as little more than a
standard to draw the line between the powers of the community and the power of the
Member States to deal with antitrust problems. 15
In Brasserie, the Court of Justice was asked a further jurisdictional question,
i.e., what must be considered in determining the jurisdiction of Article 85(1) over
intra-Member-State agreements. If the agreement were the only thing to be considered, the National Court could find the effect to be so remote and indirect as to
have no perceptible affect on inter-Member-State tradeo Thus, the agreement would
come under the jurisdiction of the national law set forth in the Royal Decreeo
However, the National Court was told by the Brasserie decision to examine the
totality of internal brewery agreements. Consequently, the significance of the case
lies in its reading of "likely to affect trade between Member states" to include not
only intra-Member-State agreements which may alone affect trade, but intra-MemberState agreements which may be part of a group of similar intra-Member-State agreements which together affect inter-Member-State trade.
12. "The four Treaty texts which pursuant to Article 248 are equally authentic
are word~d differently. The Dutch rest undoubtedly requires an unfavorable
influence ('ongunstig . . . beinvloeden') while the German an:l Italian
wording ('beeintrachtigen' and 'pr'egiudicare') are not quite as clear. The
word 'affecter' us.ed·in the French text is most often interpreted to be neutral,
as· a mere influe~~ing. It is true however the 'affecter' is used not only as
meaning the neutral 'have an influence on
but also in a negative sense e.g.
in the phrase 'the disease affects the organism."' Arved Deringer, Il:!.~ Com_Q,etition Law of the Eur_opzan Economic Community at 22 (1968) [Hereinafter
cited as Deringer].
13. Consten-Grundig v. E.E.:.~£::ommissionl ~llQ.@ at 7643.
14. See Deringer at 2 3.
15. See Kelleher Ihe QQ!!l_mon Market Sf1titru ~Laws_;_ The firs! Ten Years 12
Antitrust Bull. 12191 1932.
I
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The willingness of the Court to broaden the jurisdictional language of Article
85(1) to include contracts to be performed by the parties within one nation can be contrasted with opinions dealing with the application of Article '85(1). For example, in
Etat Francais v. Nicoles & Societe Brandt, 16 the Cour .d'Appeal D'Amiens (Nat-ional
Court of France) found that the refusal of a French company to honor an agreement
with a French retailer did not meet the requirement of Article 85(1). The National
Court stressing that both pu"ties were French residents, felt no compulsion to
submit the question to the Court of Justice, since the agreement could not have any
effect on trade between states. Instead, the Court concluded that the contract could
only have internal effect. Finding that the agreement was not incompatible with the
Common Market, the Court held that the French court had jurisdiction to enforce
the agreement.
In Vereniging Van F'abukanten En Importeurs Van Berbuuksarlikelen
(F. I. V. A. ) v. Mertens_ (no. 2) 1'/, a similar case arose before a Dutch court. Here
the signatories of the agreement were all residents of the Netherlands, wherein the
products originated. The Court found that this agreement did not affect trade between
Member states so as to be subject to Regulation 17 18 implementing Article 85(1).
Therefore, it refused to hold that the agreement should have been registered for
notification with the Commission. The Court relied upon Article 4(2)(i) of Regulation
17, which states:

Paragraph 1 above19 should not be aJ?plicative
to agreements, decisions and concerted practlces
where: (i) undertakings of only one Member
State take part and such agreements, decisions,
and concerted practices involves neither imports
nor exports between Member States.

16. [1963] C.M.L.R. 239.
17. [1963] C.M.L.R. 329.
18. Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation 17 provide that if the parties to an agreement which
violates 85(1) wish to obtain an 85(3) exemption, they must, with certain exceptions,
notify the commission of the agreement. The parties may also obtain "negative
clearance" under Article 2 by which the parties notify to the commission, and it
finds no grounds to intervene with respect to the agreement. For a good treatment
of the functioning of the commission, ~. Kelleher, supra.
19. Paragraph 1 provides:
"The Commission shall be notified of any agreements, decisions of concerted
practices referred to in Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Treaty which have come
into being after the entry into force of the present regulation and for which those
concerned wish to invoke Article 85, paragraph 3. As long as such notification
has not taken place, no decision to issue a declaration under Article 85, paragraph
3, may be rendered. "
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The Court asserted that this language indicated that the Commission felt that
intra- Member-State agreements were beyond the powers of the Commission.
This case is a further example of the opinion that agreements between parties
wholly within one Member State do not ordinarily meet the requirements of Article
85(1).
These two cases demonstrate a prevalent belief that most intra-MemberState agreements do not come within the Treaty of Rome. These national courts,
in 1963, faced with the still new antitrust law of the Treaty of Rome, had no
trouble holding that such intra-Member-State agreements could not meet the requirements of 85(1).
However, the Court of Justice in Brasserie made it clear that intra-MemberState contracts may meet the requirements of 85(1). Therefore, the line between
community power and national power to deal with restraint of trade cannot be drawn
at the distinction between wholly intra-Member-State agreements and inter-MemberState agreements. More important, Brasserie held that the line cannot be drawn at
the effect of the individual intra-Member-State agreement, but must extend to the
whole intra-Member-State economic environment.
The Dutch Court's reading of Article 4(2)(i) of Regulation 17 as drawing a
line at agreements not affecting frontier-crossing commerce points is an interesting
by-product of the Brasserie decision. Now the Commission may look beyond the
intra-Member-State agreement itself in determining whether it involves "imports
or exports between Member States. " 20 If the Court had decided differently, only
the effect of the agreement itself could be considered. Clearly, Brasserie shows
that effect, or involvement with imports and exports, as in the language of Article
4(2)(i), 21 may be found by looking at the total "legal and economic context of the
agreement. " Of course, such a holding makes it more difficult for a firm to determine whether to seek notification from the Commission.
Indeed, the plaintiff argued that a broadening response to the question submitted
by the National Court would lead to "legal insecurity." The plaintiff argued that parties
to an agreement made wholly on an intra-Member-State basis would never know how it
would be viewed under Article 85. There would be no way of knowing whether there were
other similar agreements in the relevant market. It also appears that a broader
ruling on this issue would make it more difficult to determine whether the agreement
was covered by the national law or by Common Market cartel law.
The Advocate General, in his opinion in Brasserie, noted the obvious validity of
this argument. 22 However, he pointed out that in reality, the type of firms using such
agreements have available extensive market research which affords the firm an idea
of the extensiveness of such agreements. In the opinion of the Advocate General, when
the e~onomic atmosibere is close to the legal limit, a firm should apply for an exemption under Article 85(3). Accordingly, the Advocate General suggested that the
20. See Deringer supra at 24.
21. For a discussion of the apparent slight difference between "involves" and "affect"
~ id. at 277.
.
22. 2 CCH Com. Mkt. Rep. 8053 at 7809.
1
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Commission take steps to limit the insecurity by providing adequate guidelines.
The Advocate General advised the Court to postpone its decision on the contract
pending the Commission's ruling on the agreement under Regulation 17, Article
6. 23 Unfortunately, the Court made no mention of the use of a Commission
ruling, and apparently left to the National Court the task of deciding the validity
of the contracts. 24
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of the Common Market is the creation of a single market leading to economic growth and an accelerated rise in the standard of living. 25
However, European economic merger will not be possible if the governmental obstacles to free trade which the Treaty of Rome seeks to remove, are replaced by
private agreements. For this reason, the area of exclusive distributorships was
amongthe first tobe dealt withinan attempt tocreate a single market. This priority
logically flows from the gradual elimination of barriers between states. In Grundig, the
barriers fell whenever frontier-crossing commerce was involved. Brasserie opens the
door to the elimination of barriers raised by agreements within one Member state.
There is no question that an agreement between two firms in one member
nation may meet the requirements of Article 85(1) where a distributor has a unique
position and manufacturers in other Member states could not find a substitute
distributor. However, such cases are rare exceptions. 26 Brasserie found that
jurisdiction does not have to be limited to the above situation; instead, it held that
decisions under Article 85 must take into account the simultaneous existence of
numerous similar agreements. Thus, more barriers to economic integration in
the C0mmon Market are eliminated and slowly, the Community is approaching the
economic federalism envisioned by the drafters of the Treaty of Rome. 27

Charles H. Koch, Jr.
23. Article 6 gives retroactive affect to certain commission declarations.
24. For a discussion of the National Court's role in "harmonizing national and Treaty
law", see Ebb, The ~rundig-Consten Case Revisited: Judicial Harmonization of
Nation Law £nd Treaty Law in the Common Market, 115 U. Penn. L. Rev. 855
(1967).
25. See Hahn, Exc1u_sive Distributorship Agreements in the European Common Market:
Antitrust Laws on !_he Move, 16 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 {19 67).
26. 2 CCH Com Mkt. Rep. 8053 at 7806.
2 7. SeEl_ Lagrange, !he Court of Justice ~ ~ Factor in European Integration,
15 Am. J. Comp. L. 709 (1966-67).
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